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CVE-2023-4346

KEVKNX Association KNX Protocol Connection Authorization Option 1 Overly Restrictive Account Lockout Mechanism Vulnerability

KNX Association KNX Protocol Connection Authorization Option 1 contains an overly restrictive account lockout mechanism vulnerability that could allow an attacker to purge all devices without additional security options enabled and set a BCU key to lock the device.

KNX devices that use KNX Connection Authorization and support Option 1 are, depending on the implementation, vulnerable to being locked and users being unable to reset them to gain access to the device. The BCU key feature on the devices can be used to create a password for the device, but this password can often not be reset without entering the current password. If the device is configured to interface with a network, an attacker with access to that network could interface with the KNX installation, purge all devices without additional security options enabled, and set a BCU key, locking the device. Even if a device is not connected to a network, an attacker with physical access to the device could also exploit this vulnerability in the same way.

CVSS 3.1 vectorCVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:H
PublishedAug 29, 2023
Last modifiedJul 16, 2026
Added to KEVJul 15, 2026
Remediation dueJul 29, 2026
    68
    Risk assessment · High

    Actively exploited. Patch immediately.

    Exploitation
    Confirmed in the wild (CISA KEV)
    Federal remediation deadline
    Overdue by 89 days
    CVSS
    7.5 HIGH
    EPSS (30-day exploit probability)
    1.4% · top 28% of all CVEs
    Weakness
    CWE-645
    Attack vector
    Network, remotely reachable
    Preconditions
    No privileges and no user interaction
    1. 1.Apply mitigations in accordance with vendor instructions, ensuring compliance with CISA’s BOD 26-04 Prioritizing Security Updates Based on Risk (see URL in Notes) guidance and CISA’s “Forensics Triage Requirements” (see URL in Notes). Follow applicable BOD 26-04 guidance for cloud services or discontinue use of the product if mitigations are unavailable. Stakeholders are responsible for evaluating each asset's internet exposure and ensuring adherence to BOD 26-04 patching guidelines.
    2. 2.Treat as emergency change: patch or isolate internet-facing instances first.
    3. 3.Review exposure: confirm which instances are reachable from the internet and restrict access until patched.
    4. 4.Hunt for compromise: review logs for the disclosure window, not just from the patch date.

    Assessment is derived automatically from the live signals above; verify against your own asset inventory.